Key points of the article
- Gold becomes a lever of sovereignty: initially mobilized to face sanctions and liquidity needs, it takes a central place in the economic strategy of AES countries.
- States regain control of the gold sector thanks to mining reforms, audits, increased public participation, and regulation of artisanal mining.
- Gold contributes to financing security and serves as a means of exchange to acquire equipment despite obstacles to financial transactions.
- Local refining extends this takeover: projects presented in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger aim to process gold before its export.
- Gold reserves open a monetary perspective
In response to sanctions following the coups d'état in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, the three countries have significantly shifted towards controlling their resources for economic survival. United in a confederation since July 2024, Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey have notably found a refuge and a strategic lever to lay the foundations for a more autonomous economy in the face of diplomatic and financial isolation: gold has thus become a key asset for the ambitions of the central Sahel countries. Initially intended as a strategic escape from financial sanctions, the precious metal has gradually become the tool at the heart of a sovereignist policy and could also become a game changer for a monetary revolution within the confederation.
Funding needs and the bet on sovereignty in the face of sanctions
Between 2022 and 2024, in response to the resurgence of coups in West Africa, ECOWAS sanctions amplified by Western economic and financial restrictions have weighed on the economies of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to varying degrees. While Burkina Faso has notably been subject to targeted individual sanctions and suspension of public aid, including visa restrictions and asset freezes, a severe arsenal of sanctions has heavily impacted Mali and Niger.
- The freezing of assets held in the books of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).
- The suspension of all land and air trade transactions with other ECOWAS member states (border closures), except for essential goods, medicines, petroleum products, and electricity)
- The halt of financial flows and disbursements of public development aid or loans by regional financial institutions.
- The exclusion from regional financial markets, effectively preventing the public treasuries of Mali or Niger from raising funds through the issuance of public securities (Treasury bills and bonds) from the banks of the monetary union.
- The freezing of public assets of transitional governments and public enterprises in the commercial banks of the region.
In addition to these sanctions from ECOWAS and UEMOA, those from the West were added: Washington and Brussels notably resorted to the suspension of public development aid, the exclusion from regional trade partnerships, and targeted financial sanctions against specific individuals or entities. Furthermore, the three countries were also gradually excluded from AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunity Act).
Regional sanctions were notably gradually lifted in February 2024, but political divergences over the restoration of power to civilians, threats of new restrictions, and the changing diplomatic paradigm of the sanctioned countries distanced the actors, resulting in a split in ECOWAS with the creation of the Confederation of Sahel Alliance countries.
The context of the sanctions had notably forced Sahelian countries to find new diplomatic, economic, and financial alternatives. The need for funding was urgent in the face of frozen funds at the level of UEMOA and the fight against terrorism. Breaking with Western partners whose cooperation in the fight against terrorism showed its limits after more than 10 years of presence, the AES countries turned to new partnerships while aiming to strengthen the capabilities of their armies and their strategic autonomy. This diplomatic diversification and urgent funding need required a new strategy: a reclaiming of resources and gold in this case.
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Gold takeover policy (nationalization, reform, and audit)
With the need to regain liquidity very quickly while circumventing sanctions, gold has become a temporary strategic escape, then a major strategic lever within a sovereignist vision that has become the leitmotif in the region.
In Mali, a mining code reform came into effect in August 2023, allowing the country to now obtain a 35% stake in exploitation contracts. Audits on companies have enabled the state to recover significant arrears. The company Barrick Gold was notably subject to a tax adjustment and had to concede a payment of about 430 million dollars to continue its activities, after a months-long standoff. Several other companies in the gold sector have also complied with the new code.
In Burkina Faso, a mining code reform in 2024 also allowed the state to increase its shares in sector companies (from 10 to 15%) as well as the royalties linked to gold prices (from 7 to 8%). State structures like SOPAMIB in Burkina Faso have been strengthened to regain control of certain mines.
The Sahelian countries have particularly turned towards controlling artisanal gold production. In Burkina, the National Precious Substances Company (SONASP) was created in 2023 with the obligation for gold panners and private buying offices to sell their production to it. Thus, the officially captured artisanal production increased from less than one ton per year before 2024 to about 8 tons in 2024, and then to nearly 42 tons in 2025 according to ministerial reports. In November 2026, the state company Faso SANU was created, with shares divided between SONASP (50%) and the Treasury (50%). Its mission is to reorganize illegal sites, including those in conflict or strategic areas. In Mali, the Malian Office of Precious Substances (OMASP) was also created this year and was assigned the goal of centralizing, tracing, certifying, and exporting gold, prioritizing that from artisanal mining and small mines.
Strategic and geopolitical objectives
The financing of counter-terrorism operations has also remained a major issue for the economies of the three countries. After the break with the Western countries, a rapprochement with Russia has notably occurred, with Moscow becoming the first "war partner" of the AES countries. Russian instructor groups and Wagner, in this case, have been paid as part of the security partnership. These operations have thus added to Mali's financing needs, which has been able to rely on reforms around resources to finance this economic cost of security.
President Ibrahim Traoré also explained, during an interview, the obstacles he faced particularly in 2023, with restrictions on purchases of weapons, hydrocarbons, and essential goods, and how gold had become the way out of this spiral.
« You know, we went through a small period in 2023 where they wanted to block us on everything. When we wanted to pay for drones, our transactions were not going through (…). When we say ECOWAS, it is the French who are there to give the authorization to acquire such weapons or not. We did not want to go through this channel. So our transactions were also blocked with arguments that do not hold water (…) At one point, it was hydrocarbons, the transactions of SONABHY were not going through. So these are indirect sanctions to suffocate us. So one day, I had all the gold production from all the mines blocked. I gathered everything and told the partners to come pick up the gold and send us our drones. That’s what we did. Our drones came, they took their gold, and they left. »
This logic of circumventing a regional hub (ECOWAS / UEMOA) dominated by French influence in the perception of the AES countries constitutes the guiding thread of their gold policy and, on a more general scale, of their sovereignist policy. Gold thus appears as a strategic exchange instrument to strengthen strategic autonomy. This explains the gradual establishment of an industrialization policy that has been based on regaining control of production. For the AES countries, gold must now be processed locally before export. In Burkina Faso, the national refinery RAFFINOR-BF was inaugurated in September 2026. In Mali, the SOROMA-SA refinery (in partnership with the Russian group Yadran) had its first stone laid in June 2025. In Niger, a joint-venture agreement was signed in April 2025 with Suvarna Royal Gold Trading LLC to create Royal Gold Niger SA, aimed at establishing a gold refinery, a jewelry manufacturing unit, and a gemstone cutting and polishing unit.
Monetary perspective
The takeover of control of the production chain and the on-site refining policy allow AES countries to also build strategic reserve stocks of gold. In Burkina Faso, the Deposits and Investments Fund has set itself the goal of creating a gold reserve that will enable the country "to stabilize the economy, strengthen the financial resilience of Burkina Faso (...) to guarantee investor confidence, support the currency, and provide valuable maneuvering room in economic policy." The monetary aspect remains an essential issue in the current sovereignist policy of AES countries.
While the CFA franc is still used in these countries that have remained in the UEMOA despite leaving ECOWAS, the project for a new currency is no longer a taboo. The takeover of gold and the establishment of strategic reserves appear as the first steps of a policy aspiring to create a currency shared by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. With the launch of the Confederated Bank for Investment and Development of the Alliance of Sahel States since December 2025, investors and companies interested in the Sahel can read as a prospective outlook: gold stocks are not just economic security stocks; they represent a first milestone towards a confederal currency, in a context where uncertainty weighs on the monetary project of the ECO of ECOWAS.